タグ別アーカイブ: cell phone

Could the approach of linking phones to create a singular, extensive distributed antenna assist in thwarting Russian electronic warfare tactics?

As reported by an American organization developing a system in Ukraine, networked cell phones that operate on specialized software might offer a low-cost and easily implementable counter to the advanced electronic warfare techniques used by Russia.

The use of electronic warfare by Russia, including techniques such as signal jamming and GPS spoofing, complicates the operational landscape for Ukrainian forces, hindering their ability to effectively utilize drones and high-end U.S. weaponry. Detecting and identifying enemy jamming equipment usually requires advanced software-defined radios, which are commonly supplied to the United States and other financially capable military entities. In contrast, smaller militaries like Ukraine’s find it challenging to secure these necessary tools in sufficient numbers due to limited budgets.

If a low-cost system is developed to pinpoint enemy jamming devices, it could empower Ukrainian operators to recover some tactical advantage against their more heavily armed opponents. This development might also reshape the strategies of cellphone network providers in reinforcing their devices against advanced attacks.

Near Christmas of last year, the Ukrainian military reached out to Sean Gorman and his team at Zephr, a company known for its expertise in protecting devices from GPS-signal interference. Zephr promptly sent six Android Pixel phones, loaded with their software, to Ukraine, and in April, they started field tests in areas adjacent to the frontlines in Donetsk.

Gorman conveyed to Defense One that the phones were mounted on drones, incorporated into cars, and arranged on stationary stands. They have also engaged in controlled experiments where their own jamming devices were used, enabling them to pinpoint the location.

The primary focus was to explore if regular consumer phones, working collectively in a network, could indicate the presence of an entity trying to disrupt GPS location data. The results showed that by comparing the GPS reception among different devices, they could detect when one or more phones were under threat.

As Gorman explained, “Our methodology primarily revolves around exploiting the sensors present in the phone. The most crucial sensor is the raw data from the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) that the phone provides. This includes automatic gain control (AGC), Doppler information, carrier phase, code phase, and other data that mobile devices collect concerning their distance from satellites, cellular towers, and other network equipment.”

To optimize performance, manufacturers install these sensors in mobile phones, allowing them to identify the nearest cell tower. The measurements obtained are crucial for the GPS-processing software that informs users of their location. By gathering data from a broad spectrum of phones, one can ascertain which devices are potentially under attack.

As Gorman explained, the computational AI we have implemented in the backend, along with the complexity of our signal and software processing, provides extensive capabilities. Instead of relying solely on sensors or prohibitively expensive antenna arrays, there is a significant advantage in connecting phones to operate as a single, large distributed antenna.

The analyses revealed additional insights into the realm of Russian electronic warfare.

The Baltic Sea is witnessing Russian interference with GPS signals, leading to the display of incorrect location data by receivers. NATO officials have described this as a perilous situation for commercial aviation. A frequent countermeasure against drones is the spoofing of GPS signals, which causes the drone to erroneously perceive that it is above an airport, thus requiring it to land or vacate restricted airspace.

Soldiers in Donetsk, Ukraine, regularly report encountering spoofing attacks targeting their drones. However, Gorman and his team have found that much of this “spoofing” is actually attributable to high-powered jamming attempts. These jamming activities occur within the same frequency bands as GPS or GNSS, which allows them to imitate satellite signals. This phenomenon results in the appearance of phantom or ghost satellites in areas where they cannot logically exist and still deliver a signal, such as beneath the horizon.

In a report to Defense One, Gorman explained that the noise detected does not resemble a conventional GNSS signal, although it does contain energy at the frequencies the receiver is scanning for satellite signals. The signal-processing algorithms of the receiver apply correlation techniques to discern and track these satellite signals. When a powerful jamming signal is introduced, it can create false correlations, leading the receiver to erroneously conclude that it is detecting satellites that are not actually observable.

Currently collaborating with the Ukrainian government under a contractual agreement, the group is focused on advancing their research to go beyond the detection of signal jammers, aiming to pinpoint their locations for potential avoidance or eradication.

According to Gorman’s email, the new techniques being developed will estimate the location of signals of interest using three inputs: 1. localization by range inferred from power; 2. localization by area of effect; and 3. triangulation of jammers based on the angle of arrival. Each smartphone will identify the interference signal, record the last known position, and timestamp the reception, generating data points across the network. By aggregating and processing these signals centrally, the system will triangulate the position of the cell phone jammer.

The U.S. military is channeling substantial funds into alternatives to GPS, often called alternative position, navigation, and timing (Alt PNT), to enable individuals, drones, and other entities to determine their precise locations. Unfortunately, many of these investments have not proven to be particularly fruitful.

As Gorman pointed out, the operation cannot proceed without a predetermined known position, and it is nearly impossible to determine this position without GPS.

The proposed networked approach will not take the place of other, more costly military systems that are utilized for the detection and identification of jammers. However, it does provide a solution that can be implemented swiftly and economically for military organizations such as Ukraine, as well as other groups that may face disruptions from jamming activities, including first responders. Additionally, while it will not replace the pursuit of alternative position, navigation, and timing methods, it may contribute to their improved effectiveness.

Gorman indicated that there could be a radically different perspective to consider. Instead of funneling all resources into Alt PNT and GNSS resilience, which are indeed useful, we might want to assess how this has become a reality. He stressed the importance of mapping and understanding the area in relation to the emitters, which would enable us to steer clear of those areas and remove the emitters.

Bearing a resemblance to a walkie-talkie, the phone blocker is a device of significant power. Once turned on, this small contraption can effectively block all cell phone signals in the nearby area. The use of such a device is not only a federal offense, but can also result in a substantial $16,000 fine and potential jail time.

Eric, a Philadelphia native, refused to be discouraged by the situation. He became increasingly fed up with the incessant cell phone conversations on SEPTA 44 buses. To avoid being subjected to these discussions, Eric resorted to activating a jamming device.

Eric noted that a large portion of the population is loud and shows no regard for privacy. To deal with the annoyance, he adjusts the antenna and turns on the device.

The use of jammers, like the ones utilized in this particular case, is against the law as they have the ability to block emergency cell phone communications and interfere with essential signals, such as police radios and other two-way radios.

Eric announced that since discovering its illegality, he is preparing to discard the jammer he bought, an item estimated to be worth $300 by ABC News.

Buying a jammer is easy, but where can you use it?

The deliberate interference with electromagnetic frequencies, also known as jamming, has been integrated into a range of devices and is increasingly being offered to individuals and organizations. Despite being illegal in most parts of the world, jammers are becoming smaller, more portable, easier to use, and cheaper. While some jammers block communications indiscriminately, there are specialized devices designed to block specific signals. The most popular among these are mobile phone jammers, wifi jammers, drone blocker, and gps jammers.

The reason why most national authorities disapprove of the use of these devices is that they tend to have a greater impact than expected. Even when used with good intentions, such as blocking mobile phone usage in schools, theaters, and hospitals, or preventing drones from flying over private property, the interference can extend far beyond the intended range. Unintended consequences like dropped 911 calls, drones falling from the sky, and impaired air traffic control have led countries like South Africa and Israel to make them completely illegal.

Jammers are commonly deployed around prisons and detention centers to hinder unauthorized and unmonitored communications between prisoners and detainees and the outside world. Some countries, such as Brazil, India, New Zealand, and Sweden, have granted exemptions or are contemplating exemptions for the use of mobile phones and wifijammer around prisons, while in the UK, this practice has been legal since 2012.

A number of countries have sanctioned or recommended the expansion of jammer deployment. In India, for instance, jammers can be utilized in educational institutions, places of worship, and entertainment venues as long as the signal disruption is contained within the boundaries of the respective locations. Although jammers were previously approved for use in settings such as theaters and concert halls, this authorization was terminated in 2012.

In the scenario where you find yourself in possession of a legally owned cell phone jammer, what options are available to you? It may be worth considering booking your next flight to Ukraine, as this country has implemented measures to prevent students from using mobile phones to cheat in exams. Consequently, Ukraine has become one of the few nations where the use of jammers is authorized.

A resident of the town of Messanges in southwestern France could spend six months behind bars after unwittingly taking down telephony and mobile internet services in his neighborhood with a signal jammers.

Surprisingly, though, his actions were not malicious. He only wanted to prevent his teenage kids from using their mobile devices to go online after bedtime.

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According to the French planning and radio frequency management agency (ANFR), a local mobile phone operator filed an unusual complaint this month – just before midnight and until 3 AM every of the week, the residents of Messanges could not use their cellular and mobile internet services.

Following an investigation, the ANFR determined that a signal phone jammer, a device prohibited in many European countries including France, was blocking radio frequencies in the area.

Around 1:30 am, a technician traced the source of the signal to a residence in the coastal town. The next day investigators, accompanied by police, knocked on the door of the man, who immediately admitted he was using a multi-band jammer.

“The gps blocker had been installed by the father of the family to prevent his teenagers from accessing the internet with their smartphone instead of going to bed,” the ANFR explained. “His children had indeed become addicted to social networks and other applications, in particular since the confinement imposed due to Covid-19. After consulting forums on the internet, the father decided that a jammer was the best solution to put an end to his kids’ excessive screen time.”

On top of possible jail time, the illicit possession and use of a jammer bring a financial penalty of up to €30,000.

“The ANFR agent, in addition to demanding that he turn off the wifi blocker and no longer use it, reminded the owner of the equipment of the regulatory framework,” the agency added.

The man also had to pay an intervention fee of 450 euros.

Some people fear that cell phone jammers could disrupt phone service for law-abiding people close to prisons. However, modern jamming technology can be narrowly targeted to minimize disruption to people outside of prison walls.

It’s time to fix the federal regulations that prohibit jamming device technology and give prisons the tools they need to fight contraband.

Installing jammers in prisons would turn inmates’ cell phones into paperweights, disrupting their criminal networks and drying up a major source of contraband.

Risks of GPS Dependence

Overreliance on GPS signals is rampant in day-to-day life from data networks, financial systems, health networks, rail, road, aviation and marine transport, to shipping and agriculture. Military platforms commonly use GPS to find their position, navigate and execute missions.

With different systems sharing GPS dependency, a loss of signal could cause the simultaneous failure of many things people rely on daily.

The European Commission estimated that six to seven percent of its countries’ GDP, representing a whopping $1 trillion, is already dependent on satellite radio navigation in Europe alone.

BAE and Lockheed are not alone in their efforts to develop better, more robust systems. Other countries have developed their systems, including Russia’s GLONASS, the European Union’s Galileo system, and China’s COMPASS.

Another related issue is the use of GPS. The FAA has been working to upgrade aging radar-based systems with GPS networks for air traffic control and positioning. It should improve safety and pilot awareness. But GPS signals are notoriously vulnerable to disruption: They’re relatively weak to begin with, using just 25 watts to send signals from satellites that are roughly 12,500 miles above the Earth. It’s so easy to block such signals that GPS jammers are sold online for $30.

Simply allocating specific radio spectrum to particular devices does not entirely solve the problem either. A recent example is LightSquared, a company that wants to build a network of 40,000 towers across the country to deliver broadband Internet access using the 4G LTE (Long-Term Evolution) wireless data protocols. The company wants to use a frequency spectrum near the existing GPS L1 band. (Consumer GPS devices typically rely on L1 signals, in the 1575.42 MHz wavelength.)